Monster games-II
Source: By Arun Kumar Banerji: The Statesman
Pakistan’s support to the militants is not confined to the Taliban. According to senior NATO officials, LeT hardly had any presence in Afghanistan even as late as 2004-05; but by 2010 it had become formidable in several Afghan provinces, indeed planning and executing a number of attacks against Indians. It was suspected to be behind the 8 October 2009 attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul, and the 15 December attack in front of Heetal Hotel. These outrages were in parallel with the 26/11 outrage in Mumbai, carried out by LeT operatives, financed and directed by the ISI. This has been confirmed by David Coleman and Tahwur Hussain Rana ~ two LeT operatives of Pakistani origin ~ during their trial in a Chicago court. The recent arrest of Tunda, another LeT operative in India, confirms that Pakistan’s involvement in “exporting” terror to this country goes beyond providing ideological training and financial and material support. It has also tried to destabilise the Indian economy by circulating fake Indian currency notes (FICN). Pakistan has also provided sanctuary to the likes of Dawood Ibrahim ~ an underworld don who has been accused by India of involvement in smuggling and master-minding the serial blast in Mumbai in 1993.
During the past decade, Pakistan has been involved not only in the turmoil in Afghanistan. It has tried to destabilise India by sponsoring a series of cross-border terrorist attacks. In parallel, it has had to contend with the emergence of the Pakistan Taliban (TTP), now a formidable force. It has carried out attacks on the Pakistan military on the one hand and the NATO forces on the other. The organisational strength, military strategy and quality of leadership of the Pakistan Taliban has improved markedly over the years. It did not merge with the organisational structure led by Mullah Omar. It sought to establish its control over the tribal areas by undermining the authority of the tribal jirgas and systematically eliminating more than 200 tribal leaders on charges of spying for Pakistan or America. By the time the Pakistan government realised the threat posed by the TTP, it was too late. It was banned in 2008; the US State Department placed it on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations in September 2010, and the UN also imposed a ban in 2010. However, it has emerged as a legitimate entity in South and North Waziristan.
Pakistan’s policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hound has now boomeranged. While the militants have tried to set up a Taliban-type regime, Islamabad’s problems were compounded by the US drone attacks on the Afghan militants and Al Qaida activists hiding within Pakistan. The drone attacks have triggered widespread anger in Pakistan, both against the government and the USA. Pakistan was caught on the wrong foot. It has denounced the raids by pilotless aircraft as counter-productive as they alienate the people and promote militancy, but the truth is that it has also effectively collaborated with the USA. The Washington Post reported in October last year that top Pakistani officials had for years endorsed the attacks. During 2007-11, when the drone attacks were intensified, Michael J Morell, the former Deputy Director of the CIA, used to brief the then Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, Hussein Haqqani, about the drone attacks, and the information was then relayed ‘by bag’ to senior officials in Islamabad (The Statesman, 25 October, 2013). The Pakistan government denied these reports, but such denials were merely for public consumption to divert attention from the secret cooperation with the US government as a price for the financial largess it received .
It is significant that the interim report prepared by Ben Emmerson, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the ‘Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom while countering terrorism’, states that there is ‘strong evidence to suggest that the drone attacks between June 2004 and June 2008 in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were conducted with the ‘active consent and approval of the senior members of Pakistani military and Intelligence services’ and with at least the acquiescence, if not the active approval of ‘senior government figures’ (The Statesman, 27 October 2013). It is not surprising, therefore, that in Pakistan, peoples’ anger is directed as much against the USA, as against the government. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, after assuming office, offered to negotiate with the TTP, but the killing of Hekimullah Mehsud in a drone attack negated the possibility.
Apart from the Taliban factor, pandering to the fundamentalist forces has led to a spurt in sectarian clashes. Substantial is the threat to a liberal, democratic and vibrant Pakistan. The killing of the Punjab Governor is a case in point as is the shooting of Malala Yousufzai. True, the democratically elected government, that came to power in 2008, was able to complete its full term and was succeeded by another elected government led by the PML(N) in 2013. But the Army still remains a powerful force, and wields considerable influence on foreign and security policies. The country now has an assertive judiciary overseeing the functioning of the government and a vocal, though divided, civil society seeking to promote democratic values and human rights. These factors might deter the Army from staging another coup, as long as the civilian government enjoys popular support and acts according to constitutional principles.
After the withdrawal of the bulk of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan later this year, the Army may try to put in place its own puppet regime in Afghanistan under Taliban leadership. If the Nawaz Sharif government swallows that bait, in the name of gaining strategic depth, it may only hasten the process of Pakistan’s balkanisation, as depicted in the futuristic map of the Middle East, prepared by Colonel Ralph Peters, a Pentagon analyst. If the Prime Minister tries to rein in the Army, the ISI in particular, and opts for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan problem through a regional initiative, alongside measures to curb terrorism and improvement of ties with the neighbouring States, it will bring about peace not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.
Pakistan’s support to the militants is not confined to the Taliban. According to senior NATO officials, LeT hardly had any presence in Afghanistan even as late as 2004-05; but by 2010 it had become formidable in several Afghan provinces, indeed planning and executing a number of attacks against Indians. It was suspected to be behind the 8 October 2009 attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul, and the 15 December attack in front of Heetal Hotel. These outrages were in parallel with the 26/11 outrage in Mumbai, carried out by LeT operatives, financed and directed by the ISI. This has been confirmed by David Coleman and Tahwur Hussain Rana ~ two LeT operatives of Pakistani origin ~ during their trial in a Chicago court. The recent arrest of Tunda, another LeT operative in India, confirms that Pakistan’s involvement in “exporting” terror to this country goes beyond providing ideological training and financial and material support. It has also tried to destabilise the Indian economy by circulating fake Indian currency notes (FICN). Pakistan has also provided sanctuary to the likes of Dawood Ibrahim ~ an underworld don who has been accused by India of involvement in smuggling and master-minding the serial blast in Mumbai in 1993.
During the past decade, Pakistan has been involved not only in the turmoil in Afghanistan. It has tried to destabilise India by sponsoring a series of cross-border terrorist attacks. In parallel, it has had to contend with the emergence of the Pakistan Taliban (TTP), now a formidable force. It has carried out attacks on the Pakistan military on the one hand and the NATO forces on the other. The organisational strength, military strategy and quality of leadership of the Pakistan Taliban has improved markedly over the years. It did not merge with the organisational structure led by Mullah Omar. It sought to establish its control over the tribal areas by undermining the authority of the tribal jirgas and systematically eliminating more than 200 tribal leaders on charges of spying for Pakistan or America. By the time the Pakistan government realised the threat posed by the TTP, it was too late. It was banned in 2008; the US State Department placed it on the list of Foreign Terrorist Organisations in September 2010, and the UN also imposed a ban in 2010. However, it has emerged as a legitimate entity in South and North Waziristan.
Pakistan’s policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hound has now boomeranged. While the militants have tried to set up a Taliban-type regime, Islamabad’s problems were compounded by the US drone attacks on the Afghan militants and Al Qaida activists hiding within Pakistan. The drone attacks have triggered widespread anger in Pakistan, both against the government and the USA. Pakistan was caught on the wrong foot. It has denounced the raids by pilotless aircraft as counter-productive as they alienate the people and promote militancy, but the truth is that it has also effectively collaborated with the USA. The Washington Post reported in October last year that top Pakistani officials had for years endorsed the attacks. During 2007-11, when the drone attacks were intensified, Michael J Morell, the former Deputy Director of the CIA, used to brief the then Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, Hussein Haqqani, about the drone attacks, and the information was then relayed ‘by bag’ to senior officials in Islamabad (The Statesman, 25 October, 2013). The Pakistan government denied these reports, but such denials were merely for public consumption to divert attention from the secret cooperation with the US government as a price for the financial largess it received .
It is significant that the interim report prepared by Ben Emmerson, the UN’s Special Rapporteur on the ‘Promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom while countering terrorism’, states that there is ‘strong evidence to suggest that the drone attacks between June 2004 and June 2008 in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas were conducted with the ‘active consent and approval of the senior members of Pakistani military and Intelligence services’ and with at least the acquiescence, if not the active approval of ‘senior government figures’ (The Statesman, 27 October 2013). It is not surprising, therefore, that in Pakistan, peoples’ anger is directed as much against the USA, as against the government. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, after assuming office, offered to negotiate with the TTP, but the killing of Hekimullah Mehsud in a drone attack negated the possibility.
Apart from the Taliban factor, pandering to the fundamentalist forces has led to a spurt in sectarian clashes. Substantial is the threat to a liberal, democratic and vibrant Pakistan. The killing of the Punjab Governor is a case in point as is the shooting of Malala Yousufzai. True, the democratically elected government, that came to power in 2008, was able to complete its full term and was succeeded by another elected government led by the PML(N) in 2013. But the Army still remains a powerful force, and wields considerable influence on foreign and security policies. The country now has an assertive judiciary overseeing the functioning of the government and a vocal, though divided, civil society seeking to promote democratic values and human rights. These factors might deter the Army from staging another coup, as long as the civilian government enjoys popular support and acts according to constitutional principles.
After the withdrawal of the bulk of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan later this year, the Army may try to put in place its own puppet regime in Afghanistan under Taliban leadership. If the Nawaz Sharif government swallows that bait, in the name of gaining strategic depth, it may only hasten the process of Pakistan’s balkanisation, as depicted in the futuristic map of the Middle East, prepared by Colonel Ralph Peters, a Pentagon analyst. If the Prime Minister tries to rein in the Army, the ISI in particular, and opts for a negotiated settlement of the Afghan problem through a regional initiative, alongside measures to curb terrorism and improvement of ties with the neighbouring States, it will bring about peace not only in Afghanistan but also in Pakistan.
No comments:
Post a Comment