Monster games-I
Source: By Arun Kumar Banerji: The Statesman
Pakistan has long been accused by India, Afghanistan, Iran and the Western powers ~ the UK and the USA in particular ~ of its involvement in cross-border terrorism in India and Afghanistan. The charge has been strenuously denied by the government in Islamabad. But the Frankenstein created by the Pakistani authorities is now threatening Pakistan itself, a fact that is borne out by the series of terrorist attacks. According to the Pakistan Security Report 2013, prepared by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, militants, nationalist insurgents and sectarian groups carried out a total of 1717 attacks across the country, resulting in the death of 2451 people. Most of these attacks were carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban, the banned terrorist outfit (The Statesman, 7 January 2014) General Kayani, the former Chief of the Pakistan Army, once commented that Pakistani terrorists posed a greater threat to the country then its neighbour to the east.
The country has emerged as the hub of international terrorism. This is the result of a conscious policy adopted by successive governments, aided and abetted by external agencies, for short-term political gains... going by the former President, Asif Ali Zardari’s own admission. The roots of Islamist terrorism in Pakistan can be traced to Saudi Arabia and to the influence of Wahabi interpretation of Islam, one that is different from the more liberal Sufi and other traditions prevailing in India and other countries in South Asia. As I had discussed in an article ‘Radical Islam’, published on 4 and 5 January 2009, the development of radical Islam in Pakistan was facilitated by the policies pursued by the late President Zia during the late 1970s and 1980s to gain the support of the clerics to prop up his illegal regime. His action strengthened the fortunes of political parties with Islamist ideologies.
The Pakistan Army, for strategic reasons, wrote Ayesha Jalal (The Statesman, 30 July 2013) ‘forged an alliance with the Jamat-i-Islami after 1977 and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also with such groups like the Deobandi-oriented Jamiat-i-ulema-i-Islam’. There was a mushroom growth of madrasas between 1975 and 1988 with the knowledge and support of the government, and nearly 8-10 per cent of the seminaries were providing military training to their students, in addition to religious instruction. These developments coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the mujahids trained in the madrasas were used by Pakistan in Afghanistan, with financial and military aid from the USA, as Pakistan became a ‘frontline State’ and an ally of America that was fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan to eject the Soviet forces. The arms aid provided by the USA to the mujahids was almost fifty times the annual assistance given to Afghanistan for development over more than 23 years. Apart from the USA, Pakistan also received substantial financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and China, as it joined the international coalition against the Soviet forces. But its real objective was to establish its own control over the troubled State.
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, many of these mujahids ~ Pakistanis, Afghans, Bangladeshis and citizens from other Muslim countries ~ fanned out to carry on the jihadi war in Kashmir, Chechnya and in the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan was emerging as the home to such terrorist groups as the Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT), with close links to the Al Qaida, the Jaish-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Islam and the Hizbul Mujahideen, among others. Many of these terrorist organisations, though banned by the UN, are still active in Pakistan, though they are operating under different names.
The Army, the ISI, in particular, had a vested interest in promoting these terrorist groups which could be used to foment trouble in Kashmir and other States, particularly Afghanistan and the States in Central Asia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US response to it came as a boon for the Pakistan Army; the ISI was the conduit for supplying arms to the mujahids and the rebels in Afghanistan. The Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who himself was involved in drug-trafficking, was used by the ISI to carry out its designs. In the process, a substantial quantity of arms meant for the rebels never reached them as these were siphoned off by the ISI. By the mid-1990s, according to one estimate, the ISI was in possession of at least three million pieces of weapons which were being ‘preserved’ for future operations. Part of the ‘loot’ was used for providing arms to the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups in Kashmir; a substantial part of it found its way to the arms ‘bazars’ in connivance with security officials who often gained financially. Karachi alone had more than 100,000 weapons leading to an escalation in sectarian violence that cost more lives than the India-Pakistan war of 1965. So from a long-term perspective, a ‘gain’ for the Pakistan Army, or at least for a section of it, was a loss for Pakistan as well as for the neighbouring States. Weapons from the arms ‘bazar’ reached the insurgents operating in Tajikistan and India, particularly in Punjab and Kashmir.
In the post-Soviet years, the Pakistan Army developed a special interest in Afghanistan. The objective was to gain ‘strategic depth’, with the connivance, if not support, of the civilian authorities. It is now established that the ISI had been involved in covertly running military intelligence programmes in Afghanistan, even before the Soviet invasion. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Gulbuddin Hakmatyar tried to take over power in Afghanistan, through sustained bombing operations in Kabul during 1992-94, with the full support of the ISI and the Pakistan government.
The 9/11 attacks on the WTC in New York brought about a change in the scenario as the Taliban was dislodged from power by the military operations launched by the US and its allies in November 2001. This necessitated a change in Pakistan’s tactics, though not in the policy, of sponsoring terrorism. It joined the war against terror, launched by the USA and its NATO allies, while continuing to support the Taliban and the Al Qaida. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime, the militants along with their ISI mentors were quickly evacuated from Afghanistan to the Northern Areas in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan was clearly playing a double game. As an ally of the USA in its fight against terror, it was receiving substantial financial and military assistance; but its support to the Taliban continued with the sole purpose of re-establishing control over Kabul. A study by Matt Walman, subsequently published by the London School of Economics, noted that there was extensive collaboration between the ISI and the Taliban led by Mullah Omar; the ISI had also developed close links with the Haqqani faction. Whatever the ISI did had the sanction of the authorities at the highest level in Pakistan. President Zardari had a secret meeting with some of the imprisoned Taliban leaders and reportedly told them: “You are our people, we are friends, and after your release we will of course support you to do your operations”.
The circumstances of the killing of Osama bin Laden confirmed what had long been suspected by the US and Indian intelligence agencies ~ Pakistan had been providing sanctuary to the world’s ‘most wanted terrorist’ while acting as an ally of the US in its fight against terrorism. The Abbottabad Commission asserted that it was due to “collective failure, culpable negligence and gross incompetence” (The Statesman, 9 July 2013). It was particularly critical of Pakistan’s intelligence establishment that had ‘closed the book’ on Bin Laden by 2005 and was no longer actively pursuing intelligence that could lead to his capture. This unwillingness to pursue the intelligence on Bin Laden might have been quite deliberate, as it is difficult to believe that he could live in a virtual fortress in Pakistan without the knowledge of the intelligence agencies.
Pakistan has long been accused by India, Afghanistan, Iran and the Western powers ~ the UK and the USA in particular ~ of its involvement in cross-border terrorism in India and Afghanistan. The charge has been strenuously denied by the government in Islamabad. But the Frankenstein created by the Pakistani authorities is now threatening Pakistan itself, a fact that is borne out by the series of terrorist attacks. According to the Pakistan Security Report 2013, prepared by the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, militants, nationalist insurgents and sectarian groups carried out a total of 1717 attacks across the country, resulting in the death of 2451 people. Most of these attacks were carried out by the Tehrik-i-Taliban, the banned terrorist outfit (The Statesman, 7 January 2014) General Kayani, the former Chief of the Pakistan Army, once commented that Pakistani terrorists posed a greater threat to the country then its neighbour to the east.
The country has emerged as the hub of international terrorism. This is the result of a conscious policy adopted by successive governments, aided and abetted by external agencies, for short-term political gains... going by the former President, Asif Ali Zardari’s own admission. The roots of Islamist terrorism in Pakistan can be traced to Saudi Arabia and to the influence of Wahabi interpretation of Islam, one that is different from the more liberal Sufi and other traditions prevailing in India and other countries in South Asia. As I had discussed in an article ‘Radical Islam’, published on 4 and 5 January 2009, the development of radical Islam in Pakistan was facilitated by the policies pursued by the late President Zia during the late 1970s and 1980s to gain the support of the clerics to prop up his illegal regime. His action strengthened the fortunes of political parties with Islamist ideologies.
The Pakistan Army, for strategic reasons, wrote Ayesha Jalal (The Statesman, 30 July 2013) ‘forged an alliance with the Jamat-i-Islami after 1977 and following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also with such groups like the Deobandi-oriented Jamiat-i-ulema-i-Islam’. There was a mushroom growth of madrasas between 1975 and 1988 with the knowledge and support of the government, and nearly 8-10 per cent of the seminaries were providing military training to their students, in addition to religious instruction. These developments coincided with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the mujahids trained in the madrasas were used by Pakistan in Afghanistan, with financial and military aid from the USA, as Pakistan became a ‘frontline State’ and an ally of America that was fighting a proxy war in Afghanistan to eject the Soviet forces. The arms aid provided by the USA to the mujahids was almost fifty times the annual assistance given to Afghanistan for development over more than 23 years. Apart from the USA, Pakistan also received substantial financial assistance from Saudi Arabia and China, as it joined the international coalition against the Soviet forces. But its real objective was to establish its own control over the troubled State.
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, many of these mujahids ~ Pakistanis, Afghans, Bangladeshis and citizens from other Muslim countries ~ fanned out to carry on the jihadi war in Kashmir, Chechnya and in the Central Asian Republics. Pakistan was emerging as the home to such terrorist groups as the Laskar-e-Toiba (LeT), with close links to the Al Qaida, the Jaish-Mohammad, Harkat-ul-Islam and the Hizbul Mujahideen, among others. Many of these terrorist organisations, though banned by the UN, are still active in Pakistan, though they are operating under different names.
The Army, the ISI, in particular, had a vested interest in promoting these terrorist groups which could be used to foment trouble in Kashmir and other States, particularly Afghanistan and the States in Central Asia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the US response to it came as a boon for the Pakistan Army; the ISI was the conduit for supplying arms to the mujahids and the rebels in Afghanistan. The Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who himself was involved in drug-trafficking, was used by the ISI to carry out its designs. In the process, a substantial quantity of arms meant for the rebels never reached them as these were siphoned off by the ISI. By the mid-1990s, according to one estimate, the ISI was in possession of at least three million pieces of weapons which were being ‘preserved’ for future operations. Part of the ‘loot’ was used for providing arms to the Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups in Kashmir; a substantial part of it found its way to the arms ‘bazars’ in connivance with security officials who often gained financially. Karachi alone had more than 100,000 weapons leading to an escalation in sectarian violence that cost more lives than the India-Pakistan war of 1965. So from a long-term perspective, a ‘gain’ for the Pakistan Army, or at least for a section of it, was a loss for Pakistan as well as for the neighbouring States. Weapons from the arms ‘bazar’ reached the insurgents operating in Tajikistan and India, particularly in Punjab and Kashmir.
In the post-Soviet years, the Pakistan Army developed a special interest in Afghanistan. The objective was to gain ‘strategic depth’, with the connivance, if not support, of the civilian authorities. It is now established that the ISI had been involved in covertly running military intelligence programmes in Afghanistan, even before the Soviet invasion. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Gulbuddin Hakmatyar tried to take over power in Afghanistan, through sustained bombing operations in Kabul during 1992-94, with the full support of the ISI and the Pakistan government.
The 9/11 attacks on the WTC in New York brought about a change in the scenario as the Taliban was dislodged from power by the military operations launched by the US and its allies in November 2001. This necessitated a change in Pakistan’s tactics, though not in the policy, of sponsoring terrorism. It joined the war against terror, launched by the USA and its NATO allies, while continuing to support the Taliban and the Al Qaida. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Taliban regime, the militants along with their ISI mentors were quickly evacuated from Afghanistan to the Northern Areas in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Pakistan was clearly playing a double game. As an ally of the USA in its fight against terror, it was receiving substantial financial and military assistance; but its support to the Taliban continued with the sole purpose of re-establishing control over Kabul. A study by Matt Walman, subsequently published by the London School of Economics, noted that there was extensive collaboration between the ISI and the Taliban led by Mullah Omar; the ISI had also developed close links with the Haqqani faction. Whatever the ISI did had the sanction of the authorities at the highest level in Pakistan. President Zardari had a secret meeting with some of the imprisoned Taliban leaders and reportedly told them: “You are our people, we are friends, and after your release we will of course support you to do your operations”.
The circumstances of the killing of Osama bin Laden confirmed what had long been suspected by the US and Indian intelligence agencies ~ Pakistan had been providing sanctuary to the world’s ‘most wanted terrorist’ while acting as an ally of the US in its fight against terrorism. The Abbottabad Commission asserted that it was due to “collective failure, culpable negligence and gross incompetence” (The Statesman, 9 July 2013). It was particularly critical of Pakistan’s intelligence establishment that had ‘closed the book’ on Bin Laden by 2005 and was no longer actively pursuing intelligence that could lead to his capture. This unwillingness to pursue the intelligence on Bin Laden might have been quite deliberate, as it is difficult to believe that he could live in a virtual fortress in Pakistan without the knowledge of the intelligence agencies.
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