World without N-weapons
Source: By H Khasnobis: The Statesman
The elimination and ban of the nuclear weapon has, since its creation and first use, been a spirited crusade of civil society organizations. However, it has never been a serious strategic objective for any State that possesses nuclear weapons. The 21st century's global security environment differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War. It was for the first time in April 2009 in Prague that Barack Obama articulated the commitment of the United States to create a world without nuclear weapons. It was only a pious wish. Except for some reduction of nuclear stockpiles by the USA and Russia, not much progress has been achieved towards that direction in the intervening four years and a half.
The interim agreement with Iran, reached in Geneva by the USA, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany, on the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment programme and temporary closure of its nuclear research center is a good beginning. In exchange, the economic sanctions on Iran would be partially lifted by the Western powers. Iran will receive the West's diplomatic recognition. The UN Security Council has endorsed this agreement, concluded after 12 years. Although it is valid for six months, it should ultimately end the dispute between Iran and the rest of the world in matters of proliferation.
This agreement is expected to bring about stability in the Persian Gulf region. It can have an abiding effect only if Iran commits itself to open its nuclear programme to rigorous on-demand international inspection that will enable the country to use nuclear technology only for the generation of electricity. It will prevent any diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to the production of weapons. Anything short of that will defeat the intent of the agreement. Iran has always insisted that its nuclear programme is peaceful; the West thought it was designed to procure a weapon. The signatory countries now need to be satisfied that this goal is put beyond Iran's reach. As it stands today, the agreement does not guarantee success. There are risks in relying on it and also in rejecting it when the alternatives are worse.
There are certain important reasons why a country might decide to go nuclear. One reason is prestige. All five permanent members of the Security Council are nuclear weapon states. Another motive is to deter or intimidate a regional adversary. Iran and Israel are adversaries. Moreover, the region in which Iran is located is volatile and hostile. Russia, Israel, Pakistan and India all have nuclear weapons. Issues pertaining to regional deterrence are acutely relevant for Iran. This will remain so. The question is whether the new Iranian government will be able to make the agreement permanent and with people's cooperation.
There are equally important reasons why most nations choose not to acquire nuclear-weapons capability. At least 30 countries that could build such weapons have chosen not to. For one thing, the cost is prohibitive. The Soviet Union disintegrated because it was financially ruined in the arms race. A poor country like North Korea may accord uppermost priority to a nuclear weapons programme, but most governments will not make the sacrifice. A decision to go nuclear can have adverse diplomatic fallout. It might trigger a regional arms race and at the end of the process end up no more secure than it was at the beginning. It might even be less secure.
Winston Churchill in his last speech entitled, 'Never Despair', to the House of Commons on 1 March 1955 said: "Safety would be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation". What he meant in this memorable quote is that nuclear deterrence induces caution during crisis, makes leaders risk- conscious and more hesitant to take military action and allows the resolution of crises before they escalate into major military exchanges. Churchill gave this speech five years after the start of nuclear deterrence between the USA and Soviet Russia.
Deterrence is a strategy for combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war. The advocates of deterrence frequently quote Churchill in support of their claim. They accept that the risk of nuclear war runs parallel to reliance on a strategy in which the risk factor is perceived to be low and no strategic alternative is available. The deterrence theory claims that the fear of nuclear devastation motivates military planners and political leaders to exercise caution and seek an accurate understanding of a nuclear rival's intentions. Nuclear deterrence is traditionally seen as a crisis stabilizer and it is the primary reason why there has been no great-power war since 1945 despite a deep geopolitical rivalry, repeated crises and a prolonged arms race.
Nuclear weapons and a deterrence theory have now become anachronistic. Deterrence is not a strategy for all seasons. There is a contradiction between a peaceful nuclear past and a fearful nuclear future. The world is completely different today from what Churchill had visualized. The key uncertainty in the current security environment is the probability of non-state actors acquiring the means to move from conventional to nuclear explosives, making their attacks of much greater consequence. States must successfully devise a strategy to deny the non-state actors the ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Current strategic trends run counter to this objective.
The nuclear weapon is a thriving international business. It is more of a profit motive than a security consideration. More nuclear-weapons materials are being produced and more knowledge relevant to the construction of nuclear weapons is being dispersed. The priorities and requirements of this approach are vastly different from a nuclear deterrent strategy. The strategy of denial places priority on achieving absolute minimal stockpiles and materials throughout the world and preventing their spread to other states because that spread increases the likelihood of non-state actors acquiring them. A world free of nuclear weapons will drastically lower the risk of nuclear terrorism.
A nuclear war has catastrophic consequences. No political, economic or military objective can justify this outcome. No human or technological device can forever operate without failure or error. Mistakes with conventional weapons can have a limited physical impact. Minor mistakes are not possible with nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons, cluster munitions and anti-personnel land mines are presently subjected to international regimes that seek to prevent dangerous or inhumane technologies from being used for military purposes. The regimes banning these weapons, while not yet completely implemented, clearly demonstrate that it is possible to eliminate major classes of military technology and make their manufacture and use as illegal. Nuclear weapons similarly should be brought under an international control regime. Giving up nuclear weapons is neither impossible nor more dangerous than the world we are living in. It may indeed lead to a safer world. A weapon of mass destruction must become a universal taboo.
Atomic bombing in Japan will complete 100 years in 2045. The world has time enough to effect a transition from nuclear deterrence and dismantle the system of nuclear forces deployed in the name of national defence. If international laws and institutions are created, nuclear arsenals can be eliminated from the world within a century after they were unleashed. It will be a glorious revolution. Elimination of nuclear weapons will release resources that can be utilized towards developing clean energy, water management, carbon-capture technologies and high- productivity agriculture. That will usher a better world for mankind.
Nuclear disarmament has been pursued for more than 60 years and enshrined as an international goal, backed by law. Deterrence has lost its relevance in the modern world, more so after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In 1994, the USA and Russia reached a bilateral de-targeting agreement according to which the two countries would not see each other as adversaries. The agreement should be taken to a logical conclusion and the two countries should make more rapid progress on further reducing nuclear weapons and increasing transparency on roles and missions of remaining weapons.
The elimination and ban of the nuclear weapon has, since its creation and first use, been a spirited crusade of civil society organizations. However, it has never been a serious strategic objective for any State that possesses nuclear weapons. The 21st century's global security environment differs fundamentally from that of the Cold War. It was for the first time in April 2009 in Prague that Barack Obama articulated the commitment of the United States to create a world without nuclear weapons. It was only a pious wish. Except for some reduction of nuclear stockpiles by the USA and Russia, not much progress has been achieved towards that direction in the intervening four years and a half.
The interim agreement with Iran, reached in Geneva by the USA, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany, on the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment programme and temporary closure of its nuclear research center is a good beginning. In exchange, the economic sanctions on Iran would be partially lifted by the Western powers. Iran will receive the West's diplomatic recognition. The UN Security Council has endorsed this agreement, concluded after 12 years. Although it is valid for six months, it should ultimately end the dispute between Iran and the rest of the world in matters of proliferation.
This agreement is expected to bring about stability in the Persian Gulf region. It can have an abiding effect only if Iran commits itself to open its nuclear programme to rigorous on-demand international inspection that will enable the country to use nuclear technology only for the generation of electricity. It will prevent any diversion of nuclear material from peaceful purposes to the production of weapons. Anything short of that will defeat the intent of the agreement. Iran has always insisted that its nuclear programme is peaceful; the West thought it was designed to procure a weapon. The signatory countries now need to be satisfied that this goal is put beyond Iran's reach. As it stands today, the agreement does not guarantee success. There are risks in relying on it and also in rejecting it when the alternatives are worse.
There are certain important reasons why a country might decide to go nuclear. One reason is prestige. All five permanent members of the Security Council are nuclear weapon states. Another motive is to deter or intimidate a regional adversary. Iran and Israel are adversaries. Moreover, the region in which Iran is located is volatile and hostile. Russia, Israel, Pakistan and India all have nuclear weapons. Issues pertaining to regional deterrence are acutely relevant for Iran. This will remain so. The question is whether the new Iranian government will be able to make the agreement permanent and with people's cooperation.
There are equally important reasons why most nations choose not to acquire nuclear-weapons capability. At least 30 countries that could build such weapons have chosen not to. For one thing, the cost is prohibitive. The Soviet Union disintegrated because it was financially ruined in the arms race. A poor country like North Korea may accord uppermost priority to a nuclear weapons programme, but most governments will not make the sacrifice. A decision to go nuclear can have adverse diplomatic fallout. It might trigger a regional arms race and at the end of the process end up no more secure than it was at the beginning. It might even be less secure.
Winston Churchill in his last speech entitled, 'Never Despair', to the House of Commons on 1 March 1955 said: "Safety would be the sturdy child of terror and survival the twin brother of annihilation". What he meant in this memorable quote is that nuclear deterrence induces caution during crisis, makes leaders risk- conscious and more hesitant to take military action and allows the resolution of crises before they escalate into major military exchanges. Churchill gave this speech five years after the start of nuclear deterrence between the USA and Soviet Russia.
Deterrence is a strategy for combining two competing goals: countering an enemy and avoiding war. The advocates of deterrence frequently quote Churchill in support of their claim. They accept that the risk of nuclear war runs parallel to reliance on a strategy in which the risk factor is perceived to be low and no strategic alternative is available. The deterrence theory claims that the fear of nuclear devastation motivates military planners and political leaders to exercise caution and seek an accurate understanding of a nuclear rival's intentions. Nuclear deterrence is traditionally seen as a crisis stabilizer and it is the primary reason why there has been no great-power war since 1945 despite a deep geopolitical rivalry, repeated crises and a prolonged arms race.
Nuclear weapons and a deterrence theory have now become anachronistic. Deterrence is not a strategy for all seasons. There is a contradiction between a peaceful nuclear past and a fearful nuclear future. The world is completely different today from what Churchill had visualized. The key uncertainty in the current security environment is the probability of non-state actors acquiring the means to move from conventional to nuclear explosives, making their attacks of much greater consequence. States must successfully devise a strategy to deny the non-state actors the ability to acquire nuclear weapons. Current strategic trends run counter to this objective.
The nuclear weapon is a thriving international business. It is more of a profit motive than a security consideration. More nuclear-weapons materials are being produced and more knowledge relevant to the construction of nuclear weapons is being dispersed. The priorities and requirements of this approach are vastly different from a nuclear deterrent strategy. The strategy of denial places priority on achieving absolute minimal stockpiles and materials throughout the world and preventing their spread to other states because that spread increases the likelihood of non-state actors acquiring them. A world free of nuclear weapons will drastically lower the risk of nuclear terrorism.
A nuclear war has catastrophic consequences. No political, economic or military objective can justify this outcome. No human or technological device can forever operate without failure or error. Mistakes with conventional weapons can have a limited physical impact. Minor mistakes are not possible with nuclear weapons. Chemical and biological weapons, cluster munitions and anti-personnel land mines are presently subjected to international regimes that seek to prevent dangerous or inhumane technologies from being used for military purposes. The regimes banning these weapons, while not yet completely implemented, clearly demonstrate that it is possible to eliminate major classes of military technology and make their manufacture and use as illegal. Nuclear weapons similarly should be brought under an international control regime. Giving up nuclear weapons is neither impossible nor more dangerous than the world we are living in. It may indeed lead to a safer world. A weapon of mass destruction must become a universal taboo.
Atomic bombing in Japan will complete 100 years in 2045. The world has time enough to effect a transition from nuclear deterrence and dismantle the system of nuclear forces deployed in the name of national defence. If international laws and institutions are created, nuclear arsenals can be eliminated from the world within a century after they were unleashed. It will be a glorious revolution. Elimination of nuclear weapons will release resources that can be utilized towards developing clean energy, water management, carbon-capture technologies and high- productivity agriculture. That will usher a better world for mankind.
Nuclear disarmament has been pursued for more than 60 years and enshrined as an international goal, backed by law. Deterrence has lost its relevance in the modern world, more so after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In 1994, the USA and Russia reached a bilateral de-targeting agreement according to which the two countries would not see each other as adversaries. The agreement should be taken to a logical conclusion and the two countries should make more rapid progress on further reducing nuclear weapons and increasing transparency on roles and missions of remaining weapons.
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