Radicals in Rawalpindi
Source: By: Suhasini Haidar: Indian Express
Kamra’s
Minhas air force base is one of Pakistan’s most prized installations —
part of a string of bases that guard the country’s north, it is best
positioned to launch anti-terror air operations in Taliban-held areas.
It houses an air weapons complex meant to build aircraft like the
JF-17s, refit F-16s and Mirages, and an avionics and radar factory. If
reports are to be believed, it also stores a part of Pakistan’s nuclear
arsenal.
It
is shocking that terrorists were able to sneak past three rings of
security to reach the heart of the airbase, even more so because they
didn’t come without warning. On August 10, The Express Tribune reported
specific intelligence inputs which said that the TTP had trained two
teams to attack an air force base in Punjab before Eid. As officials
piece together evidence on how one of their most heavily secured areas
could be attacked despite warnings, there are other dots that Pakistan’s
leaders, both civilian and military, must try to join.
To
begin with, the attack on the airbase resembles the one on the General
Headquarters of the Pakistan army in 2009 and the PNS Mehran naval base
attack in 2011. Both involved 8-10 militants dressed in uniforms and
suicide vests, armed with maps and fairly accurate information on the
layout. The attacks coincided with the announcement of fresh offensives
in North Waziristan, and the TTP claimed credit for all three.
Officials
must also investigate a more sinister link — both the GHQ and Mehran
attacks involved radicalised military men. In the GHQ attack, a former
member of the army medical corps and a former soldier were sentenced to
death and life imprisonment respectively. Last year, after the Mehran
base killings, former naval commando Kamran Ahmed and his brother were
arrested, and naval officer Mohammad Israrul Haq was convicted and
sentenced to rigorous imprisonment. In the Kamra base attack,
intelligence received by Pakistan’s agencies said the TTP’s
reconnaissance teams had cased the airbase with the “help of personnel
inside”. What seems clear is the threat to Pakistan’s army is
increasingly from within.
Finally,
the common thread could well be al-Qaeda commander Ilyas Kashmiri,
reportedly killed in a drone attack last June. Kashmiri was a commando
of Pakistan’s elite Special Services Group, before turning terrorist,
and became the founder of the “313 brigade”, originally believed to be
raised by the Inter-Services Intelligence to carry out anti-India
operations. Kashmiri also ran the umbrella terror organisation,
Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami, sourcing members of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and
other groups for operations. According to murdered journalist Syed
Saleem Shahzad, who interviewed Kashmiri twice, and wrote about it in
his book, Inside the Taliban and Al Qaeda: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11,
Kashmiri and his men maintained links with “rogue ISI and military
elements”, who “outsourced” the plan for the Mumbai attack after they
failed to gain backing for it from the Pakistani army’s leadership.
This
jihadi element in the armed forces, Saleem concluded in an article days
before his death, was also responsible for the GHQ attack and the
Mehran naval base attack. Kashmiri was named the planner for both
attacks carried out by the TTP before he was declared killed last year.
But US and Pakistani intelligence have never confirmed his death, nor
has his family ever been informed of it. In March 2012, Pakistan’s The
Daily Times reported that Kashmiri was alive, spotted at a meeting in
North Waziristan with TTP chief Mehsud. If this is indeed true, it is
one more dot that has been joined in this murky puzzle.
Internationally,
the Kamra attack has put the focus on the threat of jihadi groups
accessing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. For Pakistan’s army, though, it is
time to dedicate itself to fighting the demon within its ranks, and to
acknowledge that the extremists it once unleashed are now endangering
its existence, able to strike at will on all three arms of the military:
army, air force and naval bases.
In
India, the focus must broaden to take in what the coming together of so
many threads of terror could mean. In one of his last interviews,
Shahzad told CNN-IBN that the TTP, al-Qaeda, the LeT and Kashmiri’s 313
brigade had a shared objective — sparking off a war between India and
Pakistan. Just because they were unsuccessful in 2008 doesn’t mean they
won’t try again.
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