Democratic pluralism
Source: By Sushila Ramaswamy: The Statesman
Robert A Dahl (1915-2014) is the foremost proponent of democratic theory and practice in the context of mass societies of today. In defining democracy, he takes into consideration four aspects ~ (1) what constitutes people in democracy; (2) problem of size or scale; (3) problem of pluralism; and (4) consequences for democracy, liberty and equality in the context of an alternative scheme of change or scale in economy. His concern with democratic practice begins in his seminal work, Who Governs, Democracy and Power in an American city (1961). The focus is on New Haven, where he defends the politics of the USA where amultitudes of groups compete for influence rather than power being concentrated in the business elite. Though a firm believer in procedural democracy, he recognised the strength of the argument of the substantivists that democracy cannot exist unless the ‘collective decision-making process’ yields ‘desirable results’.
Dahl, like JS Mill and de Tocqueville, justifies democracy in terms of the capacity of democratic systems to promote autonomy as it is premised on the fact that people are qualified to govern themselves. He distinguishes between two types of moral development that he believes are promoted within democracies. The first is to gain “a more mature sense of responsibility for one’s actions, a broader awareness of the others affected by one’s actions, a greater willingness to reflect on and take into account the consequences of one’s actions for others”. The second is the concept of autonomy as self-determination ~ ‘lacking personal autonomy, one simply could not live under rules of one’s own choosing; as a result, one would be neither self-determining nor morally autonomous and to that extent could not be a moral person’.
The salient feature of democracy is its acceptance of the foundational notion of human equality, and treating persons as having equal moral worth. It means equal intrinsic worth of all human beings in making collective decisions and “the good or interests of each person should be given equal consideration”.
Dahl criticises Mills’ analysis in the Power Elite (1956), a vehement critique of the Dahl-Lipset thesis of democratic pluralism because of insufficient data. He notes that a theory, which could not be converted to empirical evidence, could not claim to be a scientific theory. The burden of such a proof has to be provided by the theorist and not by his critics. The argument that A is more powerful than B is both ambiguous and meaningless without specificity. No comparison is actually possible when two actors are performing different and not identical functions. Any ideal of complete political equality is utopian and the absence of political equality does not mean the existence of a ruling elite.
Dahl specifies the exact nature of pluralist democracies and argues that if competitive electoral systems are characterised by a multiplicity of groups who have strong views on different subjects, then democratic rights will be protected and extreme political inequalities would be certainly avoided other than those guaranteed by law and constitution.
Second, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the USA and Britain fulfil these conditions. Dahl is convinced that power is distributed and shared by many groups in society representing diverse interests and they defend their particular interests through the government, creating a proclivity towards ‘competitive equilibrium’ that benefits the citizens in the long run. At the minimum, ‘democratic theory is concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders’. This control is maintained by two methods ~ regular elections and political competition among parties, groups and individuals. He dismisses the concerns of Madison, Mill and de Tocqueville about the tyranny of the majority as misplaced, for a tyrannous majority is impossible because elections express the preferences of divergent competitive groups rather than the wishes of a strong majority. He agrees with Madison about the existence of factions and feels that it is possible to deal with its effects rather than eliminate them. Madison’s justification for not attacking factionalism is that it would be improper and wicked, and that the government’s first objective is the protection of human diversity which makes possible for different kinds and degrees of property ~ a fundamental right.
Polyarchy or pluralist democracy, Dahl’s most notable formulation, is a rule by a series of minorities, some self-interested and others disinterested, within the boundaries stipulated by consensus with none being able to dominate but all having a space for their manoeuvre and bargaining. This emphasis on consensus is in contrast to Schumpeter’s view of democratic politics as managed ultimately by competing elites. The pluralist system is decentralised, one that attempts to arrive at compromise rather than truth. The competition among groups is a safeguard of democracy. Democracy does not establish the sovereignty of the majority but a rule by ‘multiple minority oppositions’. The competition among groups establishes the democratic nature of the system. In Dahl’s reckoning, the difference between dictatorship and democracy for Dahl is the difference between ‘government by a minority’ and ‘government by minorities’. The greater the presence of competing interest groups, the more secure is democracy. Furthermore, he points out that the change in size from the city-states to modern nation-states inevitably moves from monist to a pluralist democracy. This change in scale is crucial to understanding present-day democracies. In the modern context, the very essence of democracy is realised by polyarchy that stipulates the presence of a large number of organisations and associations, which enjoy relative autonomy both in relationship to one another as also with regard to governmental power and jurisdiction. The institution of polyarchy distinguishes a democratic regime from an authoritarian one.
The preconditions for a functioning polyarchy are: consensus on the rules of procedure, consensus on the range of policy options and consensus on the legitimate scope of political activity, which act as a buffer against oppressive rule. The greater the level of consensus the more secure is democracy. A society enjoys protection from tyranny in non-constitutional provisions. It is not as if Dahl does not accord importance to such principles as separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. However, the importance of constitutional rules for the successful development of democracy is less compared to non-constitutional ones. Dahl is convinced that democracy is safe for it brings about moderation, agreement and maintains social peace if the social preconditions are secure.
In A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985), Dahl addresses the economic sources of inequality in political resources, mainly ‘ownership and control of firms’ which contribute to the creation of differences among citizens in terms of wealth, income, status, skills, information, control over information and propaganda, and access to political leaders. These differences can lead to inequalities among citizens in their capacities and opportunities. Contrary to Madison he argues against the perception that property is a fundamental right and devotes half the book to describing a ‘self-governing equal order’, a kind of workers self-management and defends it realistically to achieve economic egalitarianism that would be conducive to democracy.
Dahl is opposed to both anarchistic extremism and to a conception of politics ruled by the well educated and trained elite. A marked preference for groups and less towards institutions is an important lacuna in Dahl’s democratic formulation, and in this sense he defies the contemporary emphasis of new institutionalists. He welcomed the democratic expansion during the last quarter of the twentieth century but was skeptical if any one nation could effectively realise all the democratic goals. But he was optimistic about his vision of political equality in a situation ‘where people may live in peace and respect each other’s intrinsic equality and jointly seek the best possible life’.
Robert A Dahl (1915-2014) is the foremost proponent of democratic theory and practice in the context of mass societies of today. In defining democracy, he takes into consideration four aspects ~ (1) what constitutes people in democracy; (2) problem of size or scale; (3) problem of pluralism; and (4) consequences for democracy, liberty and equality in the context of an alternative scheme of change or scale in economy. His concern with democratic practice begins in his seminal work, Who Governs, Democracy and Power in an American city (1961). The focus is on New Haven, where he defends the politics of the USA where amultitudes of groups compete for influence rather than power being concentrated in the business elite. Though a firm believer in procedural democracy, he recognised the strength of the argument of the substantivists that democracy cannot exist unless the ‘collective decision-making process’ yields ‘desirable results’.
Dahl, like JS Mill and de Tocqueville, justifies democracy in terms of the capacity of democratic systems to promote autonomy as it is premised on the fact that people are qualified to govern themselves. He distinguishes between two types of moral development that he believes are promoted within democracies. The first is to gain “a more mature sense of responsibility for one’s actions, a broader awareness of the others affected by one’s actions, a greater willingness to reflect on and take into account the consequences of one’s actions for others”. The second is the concept of autonomy as self-determination ~ ‘lacking personal autonomy, one simply could not live under rules of one’s own choosing; as a result, one would be neither self-determining nor morally autonomous and to that extent could not be a moral person’.
The salient feature of democracy is its acceptance of the foundational notion of human equality, and treating persons as having equal moral worth. It means equal intrinsic worth of all human beings in making collective decisions and “the good or interests of each person should be given equal consideration”.
Dahl criticises Mills’ analysis in the Power Elite (1956), a vehement critique of the Dahl-Lipset thesis of democratic pluralism because of insufficient data. He notes that a theory, which could not be converted to empirical evidence, could not claim to be a scientific theory. The burden of such a proof has to be provided by the theorist and not by his critics. The argument that A is more powerful than B is both ambiguous and meaningless without specificity. No comparison is actually possible when two actors are performing different and not identical functions. Any ideal of complete political equality is utopian and the absence of political equality does not mean the existence of a ruling elite.
Dahl specifies the exact nature of pluralist democracies and argues that if competitive electoral systems are characterised by a multiplicity of groups who have strong views on different subjects, then democratic rights will be protected and extreme political inequalities would be certainly avoided other than those guaranteed by law and constitution.
Second, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the USA and Britain fulfil these conditions. Dahl is convinced that power is distributed and shared by many groups in society representing diverse interests and they defend their particular interests through the government, creating a proclivity towards ‘competitive equilibrium’ that benefits the citizens in the long run. At the minimum, ‘democratic theory is concerned with processes by which ordinary citizens exert a relatively high degree of control over leaders’. This control is maintained by two methods ~ regular elections and political competition among parties, groups and individuals. He dismisses the concerns of Madison, Mill and de Tocqueville about the tyranny of the majority as misplaced, for a tyrannous majority is impossible because elections express the preferences of divergent competitive groups rather than the wishes of a strong majority. He agrees with Madison about the existence of factions and feels that it is possible to deal with its effects rather than eliminate them. Madison’s justification for not attacking factionalism is that it would be improper and wicked, and that the government’s first objective is the protection of human diversity which makes possible for different kinds and degrees of property ~ a fundamental right.
Polyarchy or pluralist democracy, Dahl’s most notable formulation, is a rule by a series of minorities, some self-interested and others disinterested, within the boundaries stipulated by consensus with none being able to dominate but all having a space for their manoeuvre and bargaining. This emphasis on consensus is in contrast to Schumpeter’s view of democratic politics as managed ultimately by competing elites. The pluralist system is decentralised, one that attempts to arrive at compromise rather than truth. The competition among groups is a safeguard of democracy. Democracy does not establish the sovereignty of the majority but a rule by ‘multiple minority oppositions’. The competition among groups establishes the democratic nature of the system. In Dahl’s reckoning, the difference between dictatorship and democracy for Dahl is the difference between ‘government by a minority’ and ‘government by minorities’. The greater the presence of competing interest groups, the more secure is democracy. Furthermore, he points out that the change in size from the city-states to modern nation-states inevitably moves from monist to a pluralist democracy. This change in scale is crucial to understanding present-day democracies. In the modern context, the very essence of democracy is realised by polyarchy that stipulates the presence of a large number of organisations and associations, which enjoy relative autonomy both in relationship to one another as also with regard to governmental power and jurisdiction. The institution of polyarchy distinguishes a democratic regime from an authoritarian one.
The preconditions for a functioning polyarchy are: consensus on the rules of procedure, consensus on the range of policy options and consensus on the legitimate scope of political activity, which act as a buffer against oppressive rule. The greater the level of consensus the more secure is democracy. A society enjoys protection from tyranny in non-constitutional provisions. It is not as if Dahl does not accord importance to such principles as separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. However, the importance of constitutional rules for the successful development of democracy is less compared to non-constitutional ones. Dahl is convinced that democracy is safe for it brings about moderation, agreement and maintains social peace if the social preconditions are secure.
In A Preface to Economic Democracy (1985), Dahl addresses the economic sources of inequality in political resources, mainly ‘ownership and control of firms’ which contribute to the creation of differences among citizens in terms of wealth, income, status, skills, information, control over information and propaganda, and access to political leaders. These differences can lead to inequalities among citizens in their capacities and opportunities. Contrary to Madison he argues against the perception that property is a fundamental right and devotes half the book to describing a ‘self-governing equal order’, a kind of workers self-management and defends it realistically to achieve economic egalitarianism that would be conducive to democracy.
Dahl is opposed to both anarchistic extremism and to a conception of politics ruled by the well educated and trained elite. A marked preference for groups and less towards institutions is an important lacuna in Dahl’s democratic formulation, and in this sense he defies the contemporary emphasis of new institutionalists. He welcomed the democratic expansion during the last quarter of the twentieth century but was skeptical if any one nation could effectively realise all the democratic goals. But he was optimistic about his vision of political equality in a situation ‘where people may live in peace and respect each other’s intrinsic equality and jointly seek the best possible life’.
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