Toothless defence
Source: By S.K. Sinha: The Asian Age
In a democracy, the civil, represented by the political executive and not civil servants, is supreme. The military must be subordinate to it. The Indian military has never questioned the supremacy of the civil.
Ministries in the Government of India have attached departments and their heads work under the concerned secretary. After Independence, a similar pattern was sought to be introduced in the defence ministry. A committee of secretaries proposed that the defence secretary be given higher protocol status than the Service Chiefs. Lord Mountbatten advised against this and the proposal was rejected. Service Chiefs continue to have higher protocol status than the defence secretary, though the latter now has functional superiority, operating virtually like a Chief Defence of Staff (CDS). Any proposal to appoint a CDS, or to integrate Services Headquarters with the ministry, as in all democracies, is anathema to the bureaucrats.
They conjure the fear of a military coup to which our political leadership is very susceptible. Thus, the appointment of CDS or organising an integrated defence ministry has been stalled. The Services Chiefs are also to be blamed for our not having a CDS. The Navy has always been all for it and Admiral A.K. Chatterjee was very vocal in this regard. The Army has been for it too, but based on its preponderant size and role in 1947 and 1962 wars, has occasionally urged that the CDS must be from the Army. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, the Army Chiefs were also chairmen, Chiefs of Staff Committee. They established personal rapport with Prime Ministers, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi. The Air Force felt ignored. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal strongly opposed India having a CDS and since then the Air Force has been opposing it. Under Air Chief Marshal Browne, the current chairman, Chiefs of Staff, for the first time there is now consensus among the services over a CDS in India.
Maj. Gen. Lord Ismay — with vast experience of the functioning of defence, both in war and peace, at the national and international levels — was Lord Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff. He took stock of the prevailing conditions in India. Units of the defence services had been split on communal lines between India and Pakistan. This massive reshuffle was in the process of being completed. Indian military officers had to suddenly take over from British officers, who had many more years of service than them. No Indian officer had experience of serving at the national level nor had anyone attained general and equivalent rank. No drastic changes could then be carried out to bring India’s defence organisation in line with other democracies.
Maj. Gen. Ismay recommended committees for speedy decision-making under the political executive. Two apex committees were Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) and Defence Minister’s Committee (DMC). The DCC, under the Prime Minister with defence minister and selected Cabinet ministers as members, always had Service Chiefs and civil servants in attendance. The DMC, with defence minister in the chair, had Service Chiefs and civil servants as members. The DCC later became Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs. The Service Chiefs were now not required to be in attendance in all meetings.
They would attend when invited. This became increasingly rare. The defence secretary often represented the Marginalisation of the services from decisionmaking reached the nadir in 1962, when Nehru told the press that he had ordered the Army to throw the Chinese out of the Himalayas. This was conveyed to the Army Chief by a joint secretary in the defence ministry. He asked for orders in writing. This showed that he had not been in the loop when that decision was taken. services at these meetings. The DCC was presided over by the defence minister with Service Chiefs and civil servants as members. Over the years, the DMC was wound up.
In a democracy, the civil, represented by the political executive and not civil servants, is supreme. The military must be subordinate to it. The Indian military has never questioned the supremacy of the civil.
Ministries in the Government of India have attached departments and their heads work under the concerned secretary. After Independence, a similar pattern was sought to be introduced in the defence ministry. A committee of secretaries proposed that the defence secretary be given higher protocol status than the Service Chiefs. Lord Mountbatten advised against this and the proposal was rejected. Service Chiefs continue to have higher protocol status than the defence secretary, though the latter now has functional superiority, operating virtually like a Chief Defence of Staff (CDS). Any proposal to appoint a CDS, or to integrate Services Headquarters with the ministry, as in all democracies, is anathema to the bureaucrats.
They conjure the fear of a military coup to which our political leadership is very susceptible. Thus, the appointment of CDS or organising an integrated defence ministry has been stalled. The Services Chiefs are also to be blamed for our not having a CDS. The Navy has always been all for it and Admiral A.K. Chatterjee was very vocal in this regard. The Army has been for it too, but based on its preponderant size and role in 1947 and 1962 wars, has occasionally urged that the CDS must be from the Army. During the 1965 and 1971 wars, the Army Chiefs were also chairmen, Chiefs of Staff Committee. They established personal rapport with Prime Ministers, Lal Bahadur Shastri and Indira Gandhi. The Air Force felt ignored. Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal strongly opposed India having a CDS and since then the Air Force has been opposing it. Under Air Chief Marshal Browne, the current chairman, Chiefs of Staff, for the first time there is now consensus among the services over a CDS in India.
Maj. Gen. Lord Ismay — with vast experience of the functioning of defence, both in war and peace, at the national and international levels — was Lord Mountbatten’s Chief of Staff. He took stock of the prevailing conditions in India. Units of the defence services had been split on communal lines between India and Pakistan. This massive reshuffle was in the process of being completed. Indian military officers had to suddenly take over from British officers, who had many more years of service than them. No Indian officer had experience of serving at the national level nor had anyone attained general and equivalent rank. No drastic changes could then be carried out to bring India’s defence organisation in line with other democracies.
Maj. Gen. Ismay recommended committees for speedy decision-making under the political executive. Two apex committees were Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) and Defence Minister’s Committee (DMC). The DCC, under the Prime Minister with defence minister and selected Cabinet ministers as members, always had Service Chiefs and civil servants in attendance. The DMC, with defence minister in the chair, had Service Chiefs and civil servants as members. The DCC later became Cabinet Committee on Security Affairs. The Service Chiefs were now not required to be in attendance in all meetings.
They would attend when invited. This became increasingly rare. The defence secretary often represented the Marginalisation of the services from decisionmaking reached the nadir in 1962, when Nehru told the press that he had ordered the Army to throw the Chinese out of the Himalayas. This was conveyed to the Army Chief by a joint secretary in the defence ministry. He asked for orders in writing. This showed that he had not been in the loop when that decision was taken. services at these meetings. The DCC was presided over by the defence minister with Service Chiefs and civil servants as members. Over the years, the DMC was wound up.
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