Changing Middle East alignments
Source: By S Nihal Singh: The Tribune
Recent developments in the Middle East show with startling reality how quickly geopolitical verities and alignments can change. The most dramatic change has, of course, been brought about by the phenomenon of Isis, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, later christening itself the Levant, before becoming simply the IS, Islamic State.
As the IS has set about capturing more and more territory in Syria and Iraq, it has finally brought the United States military into the picture after its departure from Iraq in 2011 in the form of air strikes on IS forces now challenging the relatively peaceful Kurdish semi-autonomous region of Iraq. For one thing, the anti-President Bashar al-Assad crusade by the US and its Sunni allies and monarchies is on the back burner. The more important task of preventing the IS from capturing more of Iraq and Syria is taking precedence. Second, the task of preventing a successful onslaught on the Kurdish region assumes great importance.
As a backdrop, the continuing tragedy of the Palestinians in Gaza, with the obscene number of Palestinian deaths by Israeli military in answer to rockets fired by the Hamas movement is an illustration of the mismatch of forces - one fighting against great odds amidst suspicions of such Arab states as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others, and the other supported by US might.
There are no easy answers to any of the crises facing the volatile region. The Gulf monarchies are usually ranged on one side, but they are forced to shift their policies from an indiscriminate funding of Sunni factions opposing the Assad regime to a more cautious policy, given the birth of first the Al Nusra, then the Isis leading inexorably to the IS. Indeed, regionally Turkey and Qatar are now classed as being closest to the Palestinians of the Hamas variety.
How these changing alignments will play out is too early to tell. But the chaos that reigns in Iraq and Syria and is increasingly impinging on Lebanon, perennially a fragile entity, are crystal clear. At the heart of the evolving new order is the nature of the change in Egypt having been transformed from first the fall of Hosni Mubarak to the one-year rule of the first genuinely elected President in the country's history, Mohamed Morsi of Muslim Brotherhood, to the coup of the present ruler, General Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, on the cusp of a popular revolt, to his inevitable election as President.
Egypt today, already the recipient of generous assistance from the Gulf monarchies, is now their ally, and although as the most important Arab nation still leads in mediation efforts between Israelis and Palestinians, seems more allied to Tel Aviv than the Gazans and the Palestine Authority.
How then are the Arab world and outside powers led by the United States to begin to resolve problems as one crisis trumps another? As far as the Gaza crisis is concerned, the US bias in favour of Israel, which it funds and arms to the hilt, is no secret. Therefore, Washington will have to lean on Egypt's shoulder to try to mediate. But in the larger regional context, the dramatic rise of the IS represents a new scale of conflict and danger. Not only is the IS a terrorist movement but it is also disciplined and brutal in spreading its creed and beliefs which are contrary to civilized conduct and living.
In purely geopolitical terms, the United States cannot afford to let IS or its Isis variant swallow up most of Syria and Iraq in the name of a divine mission. For the present, Washington has chosen to shore up the Iraqi Kurds, the most stable and harmonious part of Iraq, from being overrun by the IS onslaught. It has also been unsuccessfully pleading for an inclusive government in place of the overtly Shia dispensation of
For one thing, the Saudis are shoring up the Lebanese army with an additional $1 billion assistance. Mercifully, most Lebanese factions agree on maintaining the status quo. The one fly in the ointment is the Hebzullah movement, a powerful player who has been helping the Assad side in Syria.
The key question is whether the IS, in its triumphant onslaught on Iraq and Syria, has bitten more than it can chew. It has, in the ultimate analysis, brought the US military into the picture despite President Barack Obama's reluctance to re-engage his military in a country much the worse for Washington's original invasion. Judging by the increasing number of air strikes at IS military installations to blunt its attack on the Kurdish region, its leaders might be ruing their overreach.
However, even a beginning to resolve the set of enmeshing problems in the region is for the long haul. The US will retain its partiality for Israel for domestic reasons, if not for other factors. Defeating the IS and its allies will require the building up of a viable coalition to separate the hostile Iraqi Sunnis from their opportunistic alliance with the Isis and the dethronement of Mr Maliki., who is resisting attempts to replace him.
Another major problem is how to bridge the Sunni-Shia divide represented at the two poles led by Saudi Arabia and Iran. An ultimate nuclear agreement between the West and Iran is still possible despite the difficulties. But the Gulf monarchies are not reconciled to getting Iran into the tent, rather than sitting outside. The best that can be hoped for is a ceasefire in Gaza based on some Israeli concessions in lifting the inhumane blockade of the Gaza Strip abetted by Egypt's new rulers. Second, the US and many other regional and world powers are hoping that both the Kurds, the Sunnis and the new Iraqi Prime Minister will get their acts together to defeat the IS in stages.
The obvious conflicting interests and pursuits of the regional players aided by outside actors will take long to resolve. The world's attention is focused on the short term.
Recent developments in the Middle East show with startling reality how quickly geopolitical verities and alignments can change. The most dramatic change has, of course, been brought about by the phenomenon of Isis, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, later christening itself the Levant, before becoming simply the IS, Islamic State.
As the IS has set about capturing more and more territory in Syria and Iraq, it has finally brought the United States military into the picture after its departure from Iraq in 2011 in the form of air strikes on IS forces now challenging the relatively peaceful Kurdish semi-autonomous region of Iraq. For one thing, the anti-President Bashar al-Assad crusade by the US and its Sunni allies and monarchies is on the back burner. The more important task of preventing the IS from capturing more of Iraq and Syria is taking precedence. Second, the task of preventing a successful onslaught on the Kurdish region assumes great importance.
As a backdrop, the continuing tragedy of the Palestinians in Gaza, with the obscene number of Palestinian deaths by Israeli military in answer to rockets fired by the Hamas movement is an illustration of the mismatch of forces - one fighting against great odds amidst suspicions of such Arab states as Egypt and Saudi Arabia, among others, and the other supported by US might.
There are no easy answers to any of the crises facing the volatile region. The Gulf monarchies are usually ranged on one side, but they are forced to shift their policies from an indiscriminate funding of Sunni factions opposing the Assad regime to a more cautious policy, given the birth of first the Al Nusra, then the Isis leading inexorably to the IS. Indeed, regionally Turkey and Qatar are now classed as being closest to the Palestinians of the Hamas variety.
How these changing alignments will play out is too early to tell. But the chaos that reigns in Iraq and Syria and is increasingly impinging on Lebanon, perennially a fragile entity, are crystal clear. At the heart of the evolving new order is the nature of the change in Egypt having been transformed from first the fall of Hosni Mubarak to the one-year rule of the first genuinely elected President in the country's history, Mohamed Morsi of Muslim Brotherhood, to the coup of the present ruler, General Abdel Fatah el-Sisi, on the cusp of a popular revolt, to his inevitable election as President.
Egypt today, already the recipient of generous assistance from the Gulf monarchies, is now their ally, and although as the most important Arab nation still leads in mediation efforts between Israelis and Palestinians, seems more allied to Tel Aviv than the Gazans and the Palestine Authority.
How then are the Arab world and outside powers led by the United States to begin to resolve problems as one crisis trumps another? As far as the Gaza crisis is concerned, the US bias in favour of Israel, which it funds and arms to the hilt, is no secret. Therefore, Washington will have to lean on Egypt's shoulder to try to mediate. But in the larger regional context, the dramatic rise of the IS represents a new scale of conflict and danger. Not only is the IS a terrorist movement but it is also disciplined and brutal in spreading its creed and beliefs which are contrary to civilized conduct and living.
In purely geopolitical terms, the United States cannot afford to let IS or its Isis variant swallow up most of Syria and Iraq in the name of a divine mission. For the present, Washington has chosen to shore up the Iraqi Kurds, the most stable and harmonious part of Iraq, from being overrun by the IS onslaught. It has also been unsuccessfully pleading for an inclusive government in place of the overtly Shia dispensation of
Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki.For one thing, the Saudis are shoring up the Lebanese army with an additional $1 billion assistance. Mercifully, most Lebanese factions agree on maintaining the status quo. The one fly in the ointment is the Hebzullah movement, a powerful player who has been helping the Assad side in Syria.
The key question is whether the IS, in its triumphant onslaught on Iraq and Syria, has bitten more than it can chew. It has, in the ultimate analysis, brought the US military into the picture despite President Barack Obama's reluctance to re-engage his military in a country much the worse for Washington's original invasion. Judging by the increasing number of air strikes at IS military installations to blunt its attack on the Kurdish region, its leaders might be ruing their overreach.
However, even a beginning to resolve the set of enmeshing problems in the region is for the long haul. The US will retain its partiality for Israel for domestic reasons, if not for other factors. Defeating the IS and its allies will require the building up of a viable coalition to separate the hostile Iraqi Sunnis from their opportunistic alliance with the Isis and the dethronement of Mr Maliki., who is resisting attempts to replace him.
Another major problem is how to bridge the Sunni-Shia divide represented at the two poles led by Saudi Arabia and Iran. An ultimate nuclear agreement between the West and Iran is still possible despite the difficulties. But the Gulf monarchies are not reconciled to getting Iran into the tent, rather than sitting outside. The best that can be hoped for is a ceasefire in Gaza based on some Israeli concessions in lifting the inhumane blockade of the Gaza Strip abetted by Egypt's new rulers. Second, the US and many other regional and world powers are hoping that both the Kurds, the Sunnis and the new Iraqi Prime Minister will get their acts together to defeat the IS in stages.
The obvious conflicting interests and pursuits of the regional players aided by outside actors will take long to resolve. The world's attention is focused on the short term.
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