vStirrings before pullout
Source: By Salman Haidar: The Statesman
This year, 2014, is when the US-led international force in Afghanistan is to make its final exit. The withdrawal has been signalled long ago, and the process has been extensively discussed and carefully prepared. Some foreign troops from the international security force (ISAF) have already departed; others are getting ready to leave. By the middle of the year the retirement will be in full swing and a materially different situation will take shape. But even before that, important fresh stirrings are to be observed and winds of change are blowing. The carefully ordered, painstakingly calculated arrangements for orderly withdrawal have run into unanticipated problems, and fresh uncertainties about the future have emerged. The ISAF was intended to quell insurgency and to train and equip the Afghan army to assume full responsibility for the country’s security, but at present there are mixed reports about the readiness and ability of the Afghan army and police to step up as the others leave. That is a challenge that will have to be faced before long, and meanwhile more immediate issues have come up to claim attention.
As an index of its continued commitment to Afghanistan’s future, the USA has envisaged the maintenance of a residual military presence in that country even after the withdrawal of the ISAF. This presence would be substantial enough to act as a bulwark against the disruptive forces that still endanger the state, and is intended to provide support in a number of ways to the local security forces. After a great deal of discussion, a memorandum to this effect has been elaborated and made ready for acceptance by the two governments. It was assumed that after the extensive preliminaries the formal signing would be more or less a formality. However, despite the long gestation, President Karzai has shown little inclination to reach a final conclusion: the memorandum remains unsigned amidst a certain amount of acrimony in the public exchanges of the two sides. President Karzai, who was once seen as the chosen leader favoured by Washington, has been forthright in his observations about some of the actions of his powerful ally. He has distanced himself from security operations by US forces like drone attacks and raids on suspect villages that have resulted in civilian casualties. By so doing he has strengthened his credentials as an Afghan leader, showing the sturdy, sometimes disruptive, spirit of independence that has historically marked his people. His backing away from the pending memorandum reflects some of the concerns that have become visible over the last phase of Afghanistan’s struggle. Public resentment in that country at what is seen as an overweening US presence has been on the rise, and localised antipathies have accumulated as incidents have multiplied in different parts of the country. Meanwhile, international aid givers, who function in Afghanistan under a variety of international flags, remain concerned at the risk of diversion of international assistance into private pockets, and though aid continues to flow, it is not in the quantities considered necessary. Aid officials cower in heavily guarded compounds, unable to go to project sites, so supervision is not as tight as may be wished. In the circumstances, misunderstandings and resentments are bound to grow.
These are difficult circumstances but they have not daunted President Karzai from undertaking the bold initiative of trying to start a dialogue with the Taliban. The aim of parleying with the opposition is not new and often in the past Mr Karzai has spoken of the need for such an effort, though reactions both within the country and abroad were, and remain, very mixed. It is feared by some that the government is still rather fragile and dialogue with an undefeated foe may only add to the strength of the opposition. Nor is it easy to identify reliable interlocutors, for the insurgents are no monolithic formation and are widely scattered in the country. Moreover, it has been argued by many that there is no such thing as a ‘good’ Taliban to parley with and the only course is to persist in the field until military ascendancy is firmly established before beginning to talk. Notwithstanding such reservations among some of those engaged in Afghan affairs, Mr Karzai has gone ahead, has elicited a response, and a round of talks seems to have been held recently ~ maybe it is still in progress, for such events are highly guarded affairs and not much is made known about them to the public. It has even been speculated that secret contacts with the Taliban could be one reason for holding up the agreement with the USA. Be that as it may, what is evident is that Kabul has taken a stronger hand in trying to determine its own destiny, showing a laudable measure of independence vis-a-vis its powerful international supporters.
A somewhat comparable process of dialogue has now been initiated on the other side of the border, in this case between Islamabad and the Pakistani Taliban. This has been a much more public affair, in that the event has been widely discussed and analysed. No great expectations have been raised, it being considered that the negotiating teams from either side have no real authority and can do little beyond trying to set the scene for more substantive talks in the future. For now, it looks as if the two sides are both buying time: Mr Nawaz Sharif’s government needs to do something to stem the series of bloody attacks that have devastated Pakistan; and it is believed that some senior Taliban do not wish to talk at this stage and are only going through the motions of dialogue.
There is thus a swirl of uncertainty as External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid prepares to visit Kabul in the coming days. India’s role as a supporter of Afghanistan and munificent provider of assistance to the war-torn Afghan government is well established and one must expect that it will be further consolidated by the EAM’s visit. Indian economic support is appreciated locally for its effectiveness and for being free of unnecessary political overtones. Nevertheless, the Indian presence has been viewed with mistrust by Pakistan, which has its own ideas about the best course for Afghanistan.
The security issue has a particular dimension so far as India is concerned, for it has never looked with favour at the notion of talking to ideological extremists, having been the victim of damaging attack by such elements. These and other such issues will no doubt be on Mr Khurshid’s agenda for his talks with his Afghan interlocutors which should serve to strengthen the partnership of the two countries in facing the uncertainties ahead.
This year, 2014, is when the US-led international force in Afghanistan is to make its final exit. The withdrawal has been signalled long ago, and the process has been extensively discussed and carefully prepared. Some foreign troops from the international security force (ISAF) have already departed; others are getting ready to leave. By the middle of the year the retirement will be in full swing and a materially different situation will take shape. But even before that, important fresh stirrings are to be observed and winds of change are blowing. The carefully ordered, painstakingly calculated arrangements for orderly withdrawal have run into unanticipated problems, and fresh uncertainties about the future have emerged. The ISAF was intended to quell insurgency and to train and equip the Afghan army to assume full responsibility for the country’s security, but at present there are mixed reports about the readiness and ability of the Afghan army and police to step up as the others leave. That is a challenge that will have to be faced before long, and meanwhile more immediate issues have come up to claim attention.
As an index of its continued commitment to Afghanistan’s future, the USA has envisaged the maintenance of a residual military presence in that country even after the withdrawal of the ISAF. This presence would be substantial enough to act as a bulwark against the disruptive forces that still endanger the state, and is intended to provide support in a number of ways to the local security forces. After a great deal of discussion, a memorandum to this effect has been elaborated and made ready for acceptance by the two governments. It was assumed that after the extensive preliminaries the formal signing would be more or less a formality. However, despite the long gestation, President Karzai has shown little inclination to reach a final conclusion: the memorandum remains unsigned amidst a certain amount of acrimony in the public exchanges of the two sides. President Karzai, who was once seen as the chosen leader favoured by Washington, has been forthright in his observations about some of the actions of his powerful ally. He has distanced himself from security operations by US forces like drone attacks and raids on suspect villages that have resulted in civilian casualties. By so doing he has strengthened his credentials as an Afghan leader, showing the sturdy, sometimes disruptive, spirit of independence that has historically marked his people. His backing away from the pending memorandum reflects some of the concerns that have become visible over the last phase of Afghanistan’s struggle. Public resentment in that country at what is seen as an overweening US presence has been on the rise, and localised antipathies have accumulated as incidents have multiplied in different parts of the country. Meanwhile, international aid givers, who function in Afghanistan under a variety of international flags, remain concerned at the risk of diversion of international assistance into private pockets, and though aid continues to flow, it is not in the quantities considered necessary. Aid officials cower in heavily guarded compounds, unable to go to project sites, so supervision is not as tight as may be wished. In the circumstances, misunderstandings and resentments are bound to grow.
These are difficult circumstances but they have not daunted President Karzai from undertaking the bold initiative of trying to start a dialogue with the Taliban. The aim of parleying with the opposition is not new and often in the past Mr Karzai has spoken of the need for such an effort, though reactions both within the country and abroad were, and remain, very mixed. It is feared by some that the government is still rather fragile and dialogue with an undefeated foe may only add to the strength of the opposition. Nor is it easy to identify reliable interlocutors, for the insurgents are no monolithic formation and are widely scattered in the country. Moreover, it has been argued by many that there is no such thing as a ‘good’ Taliban to parley with and the only course is to persist in the field until military ascendancy is firmly established before beginning to talk. Notwithstanding such reservations among some of those engaged in Afghan affairs, Mr Karzai has gone ahead, has elicited a response, and a round of talks seems to have been held recently ~ maybe it is still in progress, for such events are highly guarded affairs and not much is made known about them to the public. It has even been speculated that secret contacts with the Taliban could be one reason for holding up the agreement with the USA. Be that as it may, what is evident is that Kabul has taken a stronger hand in trying to determine its own destiny, showing a laudable measure of independence vis-a-vis its powerful international supporters.
A somewhat comparable process of dialogue has now been initiated on the other side of the border, in this case between Islamabad and the Pakistani Taliban. This has been a much more public affair, in that the event has been widely discussed and analysed. No great expectations have been raised, it being considered that the negotiating teams from either side have no real authority and can do little beyond trying to set the scene for more substantive talks in the future. For now, it looks as if the two sides are both buying time: Mr Nawaz Sharif’s government needs to do something to stem the series of bloody attacks that have devastated Pakistan; and it is believed that some senior Taliban do not wish to talk at this stage and are only going through the motions of dialogue.
There is thus a swirl of uncertainty as External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid prepares to visit Kabul in the coming days. India’s role as a supporter of Afghanistan and munificent provider of assistance to the war-torn Afghan government is well established and one must expect that it will be further consolidated by the EAM’s visit. Indian economic support is appreciated locally for its effectiveness and for being free of unnecessary political overtones. Nevertheless, the Indian presence has been viewed with mistrust by Pakistan, which has its own ideas about the best course for Afghanistan.
The security issue has a particular dimension so far as India is concerned, for it has never looked with favour at the notion of talking to ideological extremists, having been the victim of damaging attack by such elements. These and other such issues will no doubt be on Mr Khurshid’s agenda for his talks with his Afghan interlocutors which should serve to strengthen the partnership of the two countries in facing the uncertainties ahead.
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